We initiate the study of security for key-dependent messages (KDM), sometimes also known as "circular" or "clique" security, in the setting of identity-based encryption (IBE). Circular/KDM security requires that ciphertexts preserve secrecy even when they encrypt messages that may depend on the secret keys, and arises in natural usage scenarios for IBE.
Introduction
Traditional notions of secure encryption, starting with semantic (or IND-CPA) security [GM82] , assume that the plaintext messages do not depend on the secret decryption key (except perhaps indirectly, via the public key or other ciphertexts). In many settings, this may fail to be the case. One obvious scenario is, of course, careless or improper key management: for example, some disk encryption systems end up encrypting the symmetric secret key itself (or a derivative) and storing it on disk. However, there are also situations in which key-dependent messages are used as an integral part of an cryptosystem. For example, in their anonymous credential system, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01] use a cycle of key-dependent messages to discourage users from delegating their secret keys. More recently, Gentry's "bootstrapping" technique for obtaining a fully homomorphic cryptosystem [Gen09] encrypts a secret key under the corresponding public key in order to support unbounded homomorphism; the cryptosystem therefore needs to be "circular secure." More generally, a system that potentially reveals encryptions of any party's secret key under any user's public key needs to be "clique" or "key-dependent message" (KDM) secure. This notion allows for proving formal symbolic soundness of cryptosystems having complexity-based security proofs [ABHS05] .
Since Boneh et al.'s breakthrough work [BHHO08] giving a KDM-secure encryption scheme, in the standard model, from the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption, a large number of results (mostly positive) have been obtained regarding circular-and KDM-secure encryption [HH09, ACPS09, BHHI10, BG10, App11, MTY11, BGK11, BV11]. However, all these works have dealt only with the symmetric or public-key settings; in particular, the question of circular/KDM security for identity-based cryptography has not yet been considered. Recall that in identity-based encryption [Sha84] , any string can serve as a public key, and the corresponding secret keys are generated and administered by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG).
Circular security for IBE. In this work we define and construct a circular/KDM-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. KDM security is well-motivated by some natural usage scenarios for IBE, as we now explain.
Recall that identity-based encryption gives a natural and lightweight solution to revocation, via expiring keys. The lifetime of the cryptosystem is divided into time periods, or "epochs." An identity string consists of a user's "true" identity (e.g., name) concatenated with an epoch; when encrypting, one uses the identity for the current epoch. To support revocation, the PKG gives out a user's secret key only for the current epoch, and only if the user is still authorized to be part of the system. Therefore, a user's privileges can be revoked by simply refusing to give out his secret key in future epochs; in particular, this revocation is transparent to the encrypter.
The above framework makes it necessary for users to periodically get new secret keys from the PKG, confidentially. The most lightweight method, which eliminates the need for the user to prove his identity every time, is simply for the PKG to encrypt the new secret key under the user's identity for the previous epoch. This can be proved secure, assuming the underlying IBE is CPA-secure, as long as there are no cycles of encrypted keys. However, if a user deletes or loses an old secret key and wants to decrypt a ciphertext from the corresponding epoch, it would be natural for the authority to provide the old secret key encrypted under the user's identity for the current epoch. But because the current secret key has also been encrypted (perhaps via a chain of encryptions) under the old identity, this may be unsafe unless the IBE is KDM-secure.
Our Contributions
As already mentioned, in this work we define a form of circular/KDM security for identity-based encryption, and give a standard-model construction based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem, hence on worst-case lattice problems via the reductions of [Reg05, Pei09] .
As in prior positive results on circular security [BHHO08, ACPS09, BG10] , our definition allows the adversary to obtain encrypted "key cliques" for affine functions of the users' secret keys. More precisely, for any tuple of identities (id 1 , . . . , id d ), the attacker may adaptively query encryptions of f (sk id 1 , . . . , sk id d ) under any of the identities id j , where f is any affine function over the message space, and each sk id i is a secret key for identity id i . (This obviously specializes to encryptions of a single secret key.) Our attack model is in the style of a "selective identity" attack, wherein the adversary must declare the target identities id 1 , . . . , id d (but not the functions f ) before seeing the public parameters of the scheme. While this is not the strongest security notion we might hope for, it appears to at least capture the main security requirements of the scenarios described above, because encrypted key cycles are only ever published for the same "real-world" identity at different time epochs. Therefore, just as in a standard selective-identity attack for IBE, the adversary is actually limited to attacking just a single real-world identity, on a set of d epochs (which could, for example, include all valid epochs). We also point out that by a routine hybrid argument, security also holds when attacking a disjoint collection of identity cliques (that are named before seeing the public parameters).
Our IBE construction is built from two components, both of which involve some novel techniques. First, we give an LWE-based public-key cryptosystem that is clique secure (even for an unbounded number of users) for affine functions, and is suitable for embedding into an IBE like the one of [GPV08] . Second, we construct a lattice-based "all-but-d" trapdoor function that serves as the main foundation of the IBE. We elaborate on these two contributions next.
Clique-secure public-key cryptosystem. We first recall that Applebaum et al. [ACPS09] showed that a variant of Regev's so-called "primal" LWE cryptosystem [Reg05] is clique secure for affine functions. Unfortunately, this primal-type system does not seem suitable as the foundation for identity-based encryption using the tools of [GPV08] . The first reason is that the proof of clique security from [ACPS09] needs the users' public keys to be completely independent, rather than incorporating a shared random string (like the public parameters in an IBE system). The second reason is a bit more technical, and is already described in [GPV08] : in primal-style systems, the user-specific public keys are exponentially sparse pseudorandom values (with unique secret keys), and it is difficult to design an appropriate mapping from identities to valid public keys that actually admit usable secret keys.
Therefore, we first need to obtain clique security for a so-called "dual"-type cryptosystem (using the terminology from [GPV08] ), in which every syntactically valid public key has a functional secret key (actually, many such secret keys) that can be extracted by the PKG. It turns out that achieving this goal is quite a bit more technically challenging than it was for the "primal"-style schemes. This is primarily because the KDM-secure scheme from [ACPS09] (like the earlier one from [BHHO08] ) has the nice property that given the public key alone, one can efficiently generate statistically well-distributed encryptions of the secret key (without knowing the corresponding encryption randomness). This immediately implies circular security for "self-loops," and clique security follows from a couple of other related techniques.
Unfortunately, this nice statistical property on ciphertexts does not seem attainable for dual-style LWE encryption, because now valid ciphertexts are exponentially sparse and hard to generate without knowing the underlying encryption randomness. In addition, because the adversary may obtain an unbounded number of key-dependent ciphertexts, we also cannot rely on any statistical entropy of the secret key conditioned on the public key, as is common in the security proofs of most dual-style cryptosystems.
We resolve the above issues by relying on computational assumptions twice in our security proof, first when changing the way that challenge ciphertexts are produced (i.e., by using knowledge of the secret key), and then again when changing the form of the public key. Notably, unlike prior works (e.g., [GKPV10, DGK + 10]) in which ciphertexts in intermediate games are created by "encrypting with the (possibly information theoretically revealed) secret key," we are able to avoid the use of super-polynomially large noise to "overwhelm" the slight statistical difference between the two ways of generating ciphertexts. This lets us prove security under fully polynomial lattice/LWE assumptions, i.e., those involving a polynomially bounded modulus q and inverse error rate for the LWE problem, and therefore polynomial approximation factors for worst-case lattice problems. We do so by proving the hardness of a version of the extended-LWE problem, as defined and left open by the recent work of [OPW11] . We believe that this result should be useful in several other contexts as well.
All-but-d trapdoor functions. We use the clique-secure cryptosystem described above as the foundation for a clique-secure IBE. To make the cryptosystem identity-based, as in [GPV08] we need to embed a "strong" trapdoor into the public parameters so that the PKG can extract a secret key for any identity. Here we use the ideas behind the tag-based algebraic construction of [ABB10] , and follow the somewhat simpler and more efficient realization recently due to [MP12] . We remark that these trapdoor constructions are well-suited to security definitions in which the adversary attacks a single tag, because the trapdoor can be "punctured" (i.e., made useless for extracting secret keys, and useful for embedding an LWE challenge) at exactly one predetermined tag. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be sufficient for our purposes, because in the clique security game, the adversary is attacking d identities at once and can obtain challenge ciphertexts under all of them.
To resolve the insufficiency of a single puncture, we extend the trapdoor constructions of [ABB10, MP12] so that it is possible to puncture the trapdoor at up to d arbitrary, prespecified tags. To accomplish this, we show how to statistically hide in the public key a degree-d polynomial f (·) over a certain ring R, so that f (id i ) = 0 for all the targeted tags (identities) id i , while f (id) is a unit in R (i.e., is invertible) for all other identities. The d components of the public key can be combined so as to homomorphically evaluate f on any desired tag. The underlying trapdoor is punctured exactly on tags id where f (id) = 0, and is effective for inversion whenever f (id) is a unit in R. Our construction is analogous to the one of [CS06] in the setting of prime-order groups with bilinear pairings (where arithmetic "in the exponent" happens in a field), and the all-but-d lossy trapdoor functions of [HLOV11] . However, since lattice-based constructions do not work with fields or rings like Z N , we instead use techniques from the literature on secret sharing over groups and modules, e.g., [DF94, Feh98] .
We remark that, for technical reasons relating to the number of "hints" for which we can prove the hardness of the extended-LWE problem, we have not been able to prove the KDM-security of our IBE under fully polynomial assumptions (as we were able to do for our basic public-key cryptosystem). We instead rely on the conjectured hardness of LWE for a slightly super-polynomial modulus q and inverse error rate 1/α, which translates via known reductions [Reg05, Pei09] to the conjectured hardness of worst-case lattice problems for slightly super-polynomial approximation factors, against slightly super-polynomial-time algorithms. Known lattice algorithms are very far from disproving such conjectures.
Open Problems
Our work suggests several interesting problems. Currently, our all-but-d trapdoor function has a key size that grows at least linearly with d. Finding a more efficient construction, or an "all-but-many" trapdoor function (which is punctured on superpolynomially many tags), such as the one of [Hof12] , would be particularly useful. Another natural extension would be to construct a KDM-secure IBE scheme which can be proved fully secure, i.e., under an adaptive choice of target identities.
It would also be interesting to construct a KDM-secure IBE from other mathematical structures that support IBE, i.e., bilinear pairings and quadratic residues. Both have been used to build KDM-secure encryption alone (in [BHHO08] and [BG10] , respectively), but by imposing a special structure on secret keys; it is unclear to us whether this structure can be incorporated into IBE schemes.
A less obvious extension would be to construct an IBE scheme that satisfies notions of KDM security for the master secret key, instead of the user secret keys. Under a sufficiently strong security notion, such a scheme could be used to construct a KDM-CCA secure scheme using the transformation from [BCHK07] . We note that in a concurrent and independent work, Galindo et al. [GHV12] solved (using bilinear pairings) variants of these problems in which the number of challenge ciphertexts is a priori bounded.
Preliminaries
We denote the real numbers by R and the integers by Z. For a positive integer d, we use [d] to denote the set {1, . . . , d}. We denote vectors over R and Z with lower-case bold letters (e.g. x), and matrices by upper-case bold letters (e.g. A). We say that a function is negligible, written negl(n), if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in n. The statistical distance between two distributions X, Y over a finite or countable
Statistical distance is a metric, and in particular obeys the triangle inequality. Let {X n } and {Y n } be ensembles of random variables indexed by the security parameter n. We say that X and Y are statistically close if ∆(X n , Y n ) = negl(n). For a matrix X ∈ R n×k , the largest singular value (also known as the spectral norm) of X is defined as s 1 (X) = max u =1 Xu .
Lattices and Gaussians
A (full-rank) m-dimensional integer lattice Λ is an additive subgroup of Z m with finite index. This work is concerned with the family of integer lattices whose cryptographic importance was first demonstrated by Ajtai [Ajt96] . For integers n ≥ 1, modulus q ≥ 2, an m-dimensional lattice from this family is specified by an "arity check" matrix A ∈ Z n×m q :
For any y in the subgroup of Z n q generated by the columns of A, we also define the coset
wherex ∈ Z m is an arbitrary solution to Ax = y. We briefly recall Gaussian distributions over lattices (for more details see [MR04, GPV08] ). For s > 0 and dimension m ≥ 1, the Gaussian function ρ s : R m → (0, 1] is defined as ρ s (x) = exp(−π x 2 /s 2 ). For a coset Λ + c of a lattice Λ, the discrete Gaussian distribution D Λ+c,s (centered at zero) assigns probability proportional to ρ s (x) to each vector in the coset, and probability zero elsewhere.
We will need a few standard concepts and facts about discrete Gaussians over lattices. First, for > 0 the smoothing parameter [MR04] η (Λ) of an n-dimensional lattice is a positive real value. We will not need its precise definition, which depends on the notion of the dual lattice, but only recall the few relevant facts that we need; for details, see, e.g., [MR04, GPV08, MP12] .
Lemma 2.1. Let m ≥ Cn lg q for some constant C > 1.
For any ω(
2. With all but negl(n) probability over the uniformly random choice of A ∈ Z n×m q , the following holds: For e ← D Z m ,r where r = ω( √ log n), the distribution of y = Ae mod q is within negl(n) statistical distance of uniform, and the conditional distribution of e given y is D Λ ⊥ y (A),r . 3. For any m-dimensional lattice Λ, any c ∈ Z m , and any r ≥ η (Λ) where (n) = negl(n), we have D Λ+c,r ≤ r √ m with all but negl(n) probability. In addition, for Λ = Z we have |D Z,r | ≤ r · ω( √ log n) except with negl(n) probability.
For any r > 0, and for
Lemma 2.2. For any real number r = ω( √ log n) and c ∈ Z, the statistical distance between D Z,r and c + D Z,r is O(|c|/r).
Trapdoors for Lattices
We recall the efficient trapdoor construction and associated sampling algorithm of Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] . This construction uses a universal public "gadget" matrix G ∈ Z n×w q for which there is an efficient discrete Gaussian sampling algorithm for any parameter r ≥ ω( √ log n) ≥ η (Λ ⊥ (G)) (for some (n) = negl(n)), i.e., an algorithm that, given any y ∈ Z n q and r, outputs a sample from D Λ ⊥ y (G),r . For concreteness, as in [MP12] we take
, we say that an integer matrix R ∈ Z (m−n)×w is a "strong" trapdoor with tag H for A ∈ Z n×m q if A R I = H(G) for some efficiently computable and invertible linear transformation H over Z n q , which is applied column-wise to G. Equivalently, in place of H(G) we may write H · G for some invertible matrix H ∈ Z n×n q , but in our constructions it will be more natural to work with invertible linear transformations, without explicitly referring to the matrices that represent them. . There is an efficient randomized algorithm that, given R, any u ∈ Z n q , and any r ≥ s 1 (R) · ω(
Learning With Errors
The learning with errors (LWE) problem is parameterized by a dimension n ≥ 1, an integer modulus q ≥ 2 and an error distribution χ over Z (or its induced distribution over Z q ). For a vector s ∈ Z n q , the distribution A s,χ over Z n q × Z q is sampled by choosing a ∈ Z n q uniformly at random and outputting (a, a, s + x), where
The search version of LWE is to recover an arbitrary s given oracle access to A s,χ . The decision version of LWE is to distinguish, with non-negligible advantage, between samples from A s,χ for uniformly random s ∈ Z n q and uniformly random samples from Z n q × Z q . There are search-to-decision reductions for LWE for a variety of moduli q and parameter conditions ([Reg05, Pei09, ACPS09, MM11, MP12]). Of particular importance to us are the reductions from [ACPS09, MP12] for q = p e , where p is prime, e ≥ 1 is an integer, and Pr x←χ [|x| ≥ p/2] = negl(n). The reductions runs in time polynomial in n, p, and e.
For error distribution χ = D Z,αq , where αq ≥ 2 √ n, the search version of LWE is at least as hard as quantumly approximating certain worst-case problems on n-dimensional lattices to withinÕ(n/a) factors [Reg05] ; for certain parameters, a classical reduction is known for a subset of these lattice problems [Pei09] . Note that the original hardness result for search-LWE was for a continuous Gaussian error distribution, but this can be converted to a discrete Gaussian disribution with a suitable randomized rounding method [Pei10] .
We will need the transformation of Applebaum et al. [ACPS09] from the standard decision-LWE problem (where s is uniform) to one where the secret s is chosen from the error distribution χ.
Lemma 2.4 ([ACPS09, Lemma 2])
. Let q = p e be a prime power. There is a deterministic polynomial-time transformation that, for arbitrary s ∈ Z n q and error distribution χ, maps A s,χ to Ax ,χ wherex ← χ n , and maps U (Z n q × Z q ) to itself. The transformation also produces an invertible square matrixĀ ∈ Z n×n q and b ∈ Z n q that, when mapping A s,χ to Ax ,χ , satisfyx = −Ā t s +b.
Identity-Based Encryption
As usual, an identity-based encryption scheme [BF01] consists of four algorithms: Setup, Ext, Enc, Dec. In our scheme, in addition to the security parameter 1 n , Setup also takes in a parameter d denoting the maximum number of users in a clique . Setup outputs the master public key MPK (which includes the system parameters) and the master secret key MSK. Ext takes in an identity id MPK, MSK and outputs a secret key SK id for identity id. Enc takes in MPK, id and a message µ, and returns a ciphertext c. Dec takes in MPK, SK id and ciphertext c, and returns message µ. As usual for lattice-based schemes, correctness requires that with overwhelming probability over the random coins used by the algorithms, we have that for (MPK, MSK) ← Setup(1 n , d), SK id ← Ext(MPK, MSK, id) and any message µ: Dec(MPK, SK id , Enc(MPK, id, µ)) = µ.
Key-Dependent Message Security
We now proceed to formally define key-dependent message security for public-key encryption and for identitybased encryption. We adapt the original definitions of Black et al. [BRS02] . In their original definitions, the adversary plays a game with a challenger, and is able to make encryption queries for functions of the users' secret keys. The adversary is restricted to functions from a certain family F ⊂ {f : K → M}, where K is the keyspace for identity secret keys and M is the message space of the encryption scheme. (Technically, F is a family of sets of functions parameterized by the security parameter n and the number of users d.) The adversary's goal is to distinguish between honest encryptions of the queried function applied to the secret keys, and encryptions of a fixed dummy value (say, 0). To simplify our security proofs, in our definition the adversary specifies two functions (f 0 , f 1 ) ∈ F with each query, and must distinguish between encryptions of f 0 and encryptions of f 1 . If f (k 1 , . . . , k d ) = 0 is contained in F (which should be the case if we want KDM security to imply standard semantic security), then it is easy to see that this definition is at least as strong as (and is in fact equivalent to) the original.
To define KDM-security for identity-based encryption, we extend the definition of selective security for IBE from [CHK03, BCHK07] . An adversary plays a game with a challenger that answer encryption queries for functions of the secret keys for identities from a list I, encrypted under identities from I. For selective security, I must be specified before the adversary sees the public key and remains static throughout the game. In addition to (key-dependent) encryption queries, the adversary is also allowed to make extraction queries for any identity id / ∈ I. Our definitions can be extended to adaptive security as well. In this case, the adversary can adaptively add identities to I during the course of the game. In order to make the definition meaningful, the adversary is only allowed to add identities to I for which it has not previously made an extraction query.
For an identity-based encryption scheme (Setup, Ext, Enc, Dec), the security game between an adversary and a challenger is parameterized by some β ∈ {0, 1} and proceeds as follows.
2. The challenger runs (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1 n , d). The adversary is given mpk. The challenger then extracts secret keys for each of the target identities, running
3. A then can make extraction and encryption queries, in the order of its choice.
Extraction Queries: A can query Ext msk (·) for any identity id / ∈ I Encryption Queries: A can make encryption queries of the form (f 0 , f 1 , i), where f 0 , f 1 ∈ F and 1 ≤ i ≤ . The challenger computes m ← f β (sk 1 , . . . , sk ) and c ← Enc(id i , m), and returns c to A.
We say that the scheme is selective-identity KDM-CPA secure with respect to F if the games for β = 0, 1 are computationally indistinguishable. We define KDM-CPA security for a public-key scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) in a similar manner. Starting at phase two above (since there are no identities to target), the challenger now runs Gen d times, and gives pk 1 , . . . , pk d to the adversary. In phase three, the adversary can only make encryption queries (since there are no identities to extract), and requests encryptions under public keys instead of identities. Everything else is exactly the same.
Hardness of Extended LWE
In this section we describe the extended-LWE problem (as originally defined in [OPW11] ), and give a reduction to it from the standard LWE problem (with polynomially bounded parameters), thus establishing its hardness under a mild assumption.
Background and the Problem
O'Neill, Peikert and Waters [OPW11] introduced the extended-LWE problem as a simplifying tool for certain security proofs in which LWE is used in a "hash proof-like" fashion, and additional information about the secret key is revealed to the attacker. In prior works, dealing with such situations often involved adding some "overwhelming" (super-polynomial) extra noise in order to disguise a small but noticeable statistical difference between, e.g., creating a ciphertext honestly according to an encryption algorithm, and creating one by combining the secret key with a challenge LWE instance. Unfortunately, the use of such overwhelming noise requires an underlying LWE problem with super-polynomial modulus q and inverse error rate 1/α, which corresponds to a substantially stronger assumption than is needed in the security proofs for many other cryptosystems.
Here we recall the formal definition of the extended-LWE problem. In addition to the usual n, q, and χ parameters for LWE, we also have a number m = poly(n) of LWE samples, an efficiently sampleable "hint" distribution τ over Z m (often, a discrete Gaussian D m Z,r for some r ≥ 1) and another Gaussian parameter β > 0. The problem is to distinguish, with non-negligible advantage, between the two experiments described next; the extended-LWE assumption is that this distinguishing problem is hard. In the ExptLWE experiment, the challenger chooses A ← Z n×m q , a secret s ← Z n q and error vector x ← χ m defining b t = s t A + x t , along with a "hint" vector z ← τ and error termx ← D Z,βq , and outputs
Note that the first two components just comprise m LWE samples, while the latter two components may be seen as a hint about the error vector x ∈ Z m in the form of a (noisy) inner product with a vector z ∈ Z m . Note that the noisy inner product is an integer, which is not reduced modulo anything. The ExptUnif experiment is the same, except that b is defined to be uniformly random and independent of everything else.
Notice that because A and z are public, one can amortize the extended-LWE problem by outputting any poly(n) number of vectors b t i = s t i A + x t i and hints b i = x i , z +x i , for independent s i , x i ,x i (and the same A, z). By a routine hybrid argument, the two forms of the problem are equivalent, up to a poly(n) factor in the distinguishing advantage. We use this amortized form of the problem in our security proof in Section 4.
Prior hardness results, and an attack. As observed in [OPW11] (and implicitly in prior works such as [GKPV10, DGK + 10]), there is a straightforward reduction from LWE with error distribution χ = D Z,αq to extended-LWE where τ is any m-fold product distribution with variance r 2 , if the ratio β/(rα) is superpolynomial in n. In fact, in this setting we can securely give out an unbounded polynomial number of hints z i , b i = x, z i +x i about the error vector x. (Note that this is different from the amortized problem because all the hints are about the same error x.) The reason is that by Lemma 2.2, the noise termsx ← D Z,βq statistically hide the inner product x, z , since the latter has magnitude ≈ r x ≤ rαq √ m = βq · negl(n). As a result, the reduction can just simulate the hints (z, x, z +x) on its own. The disadvantage of this approach is that in order to be useful, the modulus q and inverse error rate 1/α typically must be super-polynomial in n, which corresponds to assuming the worst-case hardness of lattice problems for super-polynomial approximation factors and running times.
We also point out that for certain parameters, there is an efficient attack on extended-LWE when too many hints (about the same x) are given out. Specifically, suppose τ is "subgaussian" (e.g., is bounded, or is a discrete Gaussian distribution) with variance r, and the ratio βq/r (which upper bounds β/(rα) in the typical case where αq ≥ 1) is polynomial in n. Then if a sufficiently large h = poly(n) number of hints are given out, there is an efficient attack that recovers x from the hints alone, which trivially allows for solving the extended-LWE problem. To see this, view the h hints as (Z ∈ Z m×h , y t := x t Z +x t ). With overwhelming probability, the singular values of Z will all be r · Ω(
. Thus, for sufficiently large h = poly(n), with overwhelming probability the singular values of the right-inverse Z + ∈ R h×m of Z will all be small enough so that x t · Z + = 0. As a result, we can compute y t Z + = x t .
Reduction from LWE
Here we give a tight reduction from standard LWE to extended-LWE, which holds for the same parameters n, q, χ, m ≥ n + ω(log n) in the two problems, and in which no noise is added to the hint z, x (i.e., β = 0). Our reduction imposes one requirement on the parameters: for x ← χ m and z ← τ , we need it to be the case that | x, z | < p with overwhelming probability, where p is the smallest prime divisor of the modulus q. For example, if χ = D Z,αq and τ = D m Z,r , by standard tail inequalities it suffices to have αq · r √ m + n · ω( √ log n) < p. In other words, the LWE inverse error rate is 1/α > (q/p) · r √ m + n, which is only polynomial in n when q, r, m are.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine (a simulator) S such that for any adversary A,
, where the parameters of the LWE and extended-LWE problems satisfy the condition specified above.
Proof. For the proof it is convenient to use the equivalent "knapsack" form of LWE, which is: given H ← Z (m−n)×m q and c ∈ Z m−n q , where c is either c = Hx for x ← χ m , or is uniformly random and independent of H, determine (with non-negl(n) advantage) which is the case. The extended form of the problem also reveals a hint (z, x, z +x), analogously to extended-LWE. The equivalence between LWE and its knapsack form for m ≥ n + ω(log n), which also applies to their extended versions, has been noticed in several prior works; a proof appears in [MM11, Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9].
The reduction S works as follows. It receives an LWE instance (in knapsack form) H ∈ Z We now analyze the behavior of S. First consider the case where H, c are uniform and independent. Then it is clear that H , c are as well, and both x and z are also chosen exactly as in ExptUnif, so S perfectly simulates ExptUnif to A. Now, consider the case where H, c are drawn from the knapsack distribution, with c = Hx for x ← χ m . In this case, we have that H is uniformly random (solely over the choice of H), and
So in the event that x , z = x, z , we have c = H x and so S perfectly simulates ExptLWE to A. Whereas if z, x − x is a unit modulo q, then for any fixed choice of H , z, x, and x , we have that c is uniformly random over the choice of v alone. Finally, since x and x are identically distributed, it follows that S perfectly simulates ExptUnif to A.
It remains to analyze the probabilities that z, x − x is zero or a unit (modulo q), respectively. First, by assumption | z, x − x | < p with overwhelming probability, so exactly one of the two cases holds. Moreover, we have x, z = x , z with probability at least 1 2p−1 − negl(n) because x and x are independent. The theorem then follows from a routine calculation.
Connection to Impagliazzo-Naor. It is worth noting that our proof is very similar to Impagliazzo and Naor's proof [IN96] that the subset-sum function (over certain additive groups, and with appropriate parameters) is a pseudorandom generator if it is one-way. The proof of [IN96] reduces guessing the Goldreich-Levin predicate z, x mod 2 (for z ← {0, 1} m ) to distinguishing the subset-sum function's output (on input x ← {0, 1} m ) from uniformly random. But in fact, their proof does slightly more: it reduces guessing the value of the inner product r, x over the integers to the distinguishing problem; this corresponds with the hint in the extended-LWE problem. In both their proof and ours, the reduction guesses the value of the inner product; whether the guess is correct determines whether the subset-sum/knapsack instance is further randomized or not. Our reduction, however, is from the decisional knapsack (not Goldreich-Levin) problem; it also needs to provide a properly distributed hint (z, z, x ) to the distinguisher, which is why it chooses z and a supplementary x error vector itself.
Normal form. In our cryptosystems, we need to assume the hardness of extended-LWE in "normal form" (as in [MR09, ACPS09] ), where the secret s ← χ n is drawn from the error distribution, the matrix A and vector b t have m − n columns, and the hint is of the form z ← τ , b = (s, x), z ∈ Z. Suppose m is sufficiently large so that a uniformly random matrix from Z n×m q contains an invertible n-by-n submatrix with overwhelming probability. Then the reduction from [MR09, ACPS09] applies to extended-LWE in this form, with the slight modification that LWE samples in the first phase are never "thrown away" but are instead recycled to the second phase.
KDM-CPA Secure Public-Key Scheme
Here we present a "dual"-style LWE cryptosystem that is KDM-CPA secure for affine functions of the secret keys. In fact, by setting the parameters appropriately, the construction and security proof also encompass (a slight variant of) the cryptosystem from [LP11] , which has somewhat smaller keys and ciphertexts than "primal" or "dual" systems. In Section 6 we build a KDM-CPA secure IBE around this system.
Construction
The cryptosystem involves a few parameters: a modulus q = p 2 for a prime p where the message space is Z p ; integer dimensions n, m relating to the underlying LWE problems; and a Gaussian parameter r for key generation and encryption. To make embedding this scheme into our IBE more natural, Gen includes an additional parameter d, which will be used to specify the size of identity cliques in the IBE scheme, and outputs public keys A that are md columns wide. In the public-key scheme alone, the value d is unrelated to the number of public keys that the adversary can obtain in an attack (which will be denoted as below and is unbounded), and we would just fix d = 1.
•
where z = (z 0 , z 1 ) ∈ Z n+md . The public key is (A, y) and the secret key is z 1 .
(Notice that, unlike the dual-style encryption of [GPV08] , but like the scheme of [LP11] , the public key component y is a perturbed value of −Az 1 . This will be important in the proof of KDM security.)
• Dec(z 1 , c):
Parameters and Correctness
For the public-key system alone, it suffices to take m ≥ n by our use of the extended-LWE assumption and its proof of hardness as in Section 3. When embedding the system into an IBE scheme, however, we will use m = Θ(n log q) because we need the public parameters to be statistically close to uniform over the choice of the master secret key. The error parameter r must be small enough (relative to q/p) so that decryption is correct with overwhelming probability, but large enough to satisfy the reductions to LWE from worst-case lattice problems [Reg05, Pei09] ; for the latter purpose, r ≥ 2 √ n suffices. (Note that even if part of the security proof relies on LWE in dimension > n, this problem is no easier than LWE in dimension n, and so we can still securely use r = 2 √ n with the larger dimension.) Here we give some example bounds. Let r = 2 √ n, let
and let q = p 2 . Then decryption is correct except with probability negl(n): let (A, y, z) ← Gen(1 n , d). For a ciphertext c ← Enc(A, y, µ), we have
so decryption is correct whenever | x 0 , z 0 + x 1 , z 1 + x | < p/2. By known tail bounds on discrete Gaussians, this bound holds except with probability negl(n) (over the choice of all the random variables), as required.
Proof of Security
Theorem 4.1. The above cryptosystem is KDM-CPA secure with respect to the set of affine functions over Z p , under the extended-LWE assumption for parameters described above.
Proof. We proceed by a series of indistinguishable games. We begin with the real KDM-CPA attack game as defined in Section 2.5, where β ∈ {0, 1} is arbitrary. We then eventually transition to a game which proceeds in a manner independent of the value of β, thus proving computational indistinguishability between the attack games for β = 0 and β = 1. Since we are describing the games for an arbitrary value of β, we let f = f β denote the function of the secret key that is encrypted in each ciphertext query. We will be denoting affine functions over Z p of the users' secret keys z 1,1 , . . . , z ,1 as
throughout the proof.
Game 0. This is the actual attack game. We do everything normally, generating public keys (A i , y i ) with secret keys z i,1 for any number of users, and encrypt affine functions f V,w of the users' secret keys under the public key for user i as
Game 1. In this game we rewrite the way we respond to each key-dependent message query f V,w (Z), so that the response has exactly the same distribution, but it is constructed to syntactically match the ExptLWE experiment in the (amortized, normal form) extended-LWE problem. Looking ahead, in Game 2 we will switch the form of the ciphertexts to match the ExptUnif experiment.
For each user i, we proceed as in ExptLWE with parameters error distribution χ := D Z,r , extra noise β := 0, and the same r as in the cryptosystem. That is, we choose
, giving user i's public key (A i , y i ) to the adversary. (As expected, z i,1 is the secret key for user i.)
For handling later ciphertext queries, we also (lazily) generate an unbounded number of LWE vectors b, with hints b , of the form
is freshly chosen for each b, and are amortized over the same fixed A i , z i chosen above.
To answer a query to encrypt f V,w under user i's public key, we generate a fresh b with hint b as above, choose x ← D Z,r as usual, and return to the adversary the ciphertext
We now show that the responses to the KDM queries in this game are distributed exactly the same as in the previous game. To see this, simply observe that each ciphertext
which has the same distribution as in Game 0.
Game 2. This game is exactly like Game 1, except that instead of using ExptLWE, we instead use ExptUnif, i.e., we choose the vectors b uniformly at random (but still choose the vectors x for generating the hints b = x, z i ). Responses to key-dependent message queries are still generated as
Under the extended-LWE assumption, and hence under the standard LWE assumption with appropriate parameters (by Theorem 3.1), this game is computationally indistinguishable from Game 1.
Game 3. In this game, we use the LWE distribution transformation from [ACPS09] (our Lemma 2.4) to answer key-dependent queries without needing to use the secret keys z i,1 explicitly. We begin with oracle access to A t,χ (where t ← Z md q , χ = D Z,r ). We apply the transformation for each i, yielding oracle access to distributions A z i,1 ,χ , where each z i,1 is distributed according to χ md . For each user i, we sample A z i,1 ,χ a total of n times to get (−A i ∈ Z n×md q , y i = z i,0 − A i z i,1 ), and set the public key for user i to be (A i , y i ). (We write −A i instead of A i so that y i has the same form with respect to A i as it does in the actual encryption scheme.)
As in [ACPS09] , we use the auxiliary information output by the LWE transformation to construct for all users i, j a linear relation between the (unknown) secret keys z i,1 , z j,1 , i.e., an invertible matrix T i,j ∈ Z md×md q and vector w i,j ∈ Z md q such that
To simplify notation below, we will use this transformation to re-write an arbitary affine function query f V,w (Z) as a function of any z i,1 alone.
To respond to a query for an encryption of f V,w (Z) under the public key for user i, we draw a fresh
. We output the ciphertext
We claim that these ciphertexts are distributed identically to those in Game 2. To show this, we let
, b in this game is uniform over the choice of b 0 alone, just as in Game 2. Next, since b 1 = − b 0 , z i,1 + x for x ← D Z,r , we can rewrite the ciphertext constructed in this game as
which is distributed exactly as in Game 2.
Game 4. This game is exactly like Game 3, except instead of beginning with oracle access to A t,χ for χ = D Z,r , we begin with oracle access to U (Z md q × Z q ). Computational indistinguishability from Game 3 follows directly from the hardness of decision-LWE.
In this game, the public keys (A i , y i ) are now all uniformly random and independent. Moreover, since every sample (b 0 , b 1 ) drawn in the game is also truly uniform and independent of everything else in the ciphertexts, all of the responses to key-dependent message queries are just uniformly random and independent vectors. This makes the game independent of β, and concludes the proof.
All-But-d Trapdoor Functions
Here we develop a technique for constructing "all-but-d" (tag-based) trapdoor functions, which, informally, are trapdoor functions for which the trapdoor enables efficient inversion for all but (up to) d tags, which are specified at the time of key generation. This is the main tool we use for embedding our KDM-CPA-secure public-key cryptosystem into an identity-based encryption scheme.
Our construction is a generalization (to higher-degree polynomials) of the main technique from [ABB10] . For simplicity and somewhat better efficiency, we follow the construction of [MP12] , specifically the use of a fixed, public "gadget" matrix G as described in Section 2.2.
Algebraic Background
Let n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and d = poly(n) be integers. Let R denote any commutative ring (with efficiently computable operations, including inversion of multiplicative units) such that the additive group G = Z n q is an R-module, and such that there are at least d + 1 known elements U = {u 0 = 0, u 1 , u 2 , . . .} ⊆ R where u i − u j is invertible in R (i.e., a unit) for every i = j. (These are the only abstract properties of the ring we will need for our constructions. In the next paragraph we recall how to construct such a ring for any n and q, where U has size at least 2 n .) In particular, we have an (efficiently computable) scalar multiplication operation R × G → G. Note that multiplication by u ∈ R is an invertible linear transformation on G exactly when u is invertible (i.e., a unit). We extend scalar multiplication in the natural way to vectors and matrices, i.e., R a×b × G b×c → G a×c . To avoid confusion with vectors and matrices over Z q , we use u notation for vectors over R, and V notation for matrices over R.
To construct a suitable ring, we use ideas from the literature on secret sharing over groups and modules, e.g., [DF94, Feh98] . We use an extension ring R = Z q [x]/(F (x)) for any monic, degree-n, irreducible
. Scalar multiplication R × G → G is defined by identifying each a = (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) t ∈ G with the polynomial a(x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a n−1 x n−1 ∈ R, multiplying in R, then mapping back to G. In other words, scalar multiplication is defined by the linear transformation x · (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) t = (0, a 0 , . . . , a n−2 ) t − a n−1 (F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F n−1 ) t . It is easy to check that with this scalar product, G is an R-module. In addition, by the Chinese remainder theorem, r ∈ R is a unit if and only if it is nonzero (as a polynomial residue) modulo every prime integer divisor p of q. (This is because Z p [x]/(F (x)) is a field by construction.) Letting p be the smallest such divisor of q, we can define the universe U = {u 0 = 0, u 1 , u 2 , . . .} ⊆ R to consist of all the polynomial residues having coefficients in {0, . . . , p − 1}. Then |U | = p n ≥ 2 n and u i − u j is a unit for all i = j, as desired.
Basic Construction
As in [MP12] , we fix a universal public "gadget" matrix G ∈ Z n×w q for which there is an efficient Gaussian preimage sampling algorithm for parameter s ≥ ω( √ log n), i.e., an algorithm that given any u ∈ Z n q outputs a sample from D Λ ⊥ u (G),s . E.g., we can let G = I n ⊗ (1, 2, 4, . . . , 2 k−1 ) ∈ Z n×nk q for k = lg q . As input, the trapdoor generator takes:
• a (usually uniformly random) matrixĀ ∈ Z (nd)×m q for somem ≥ 1, which is made up of stacked submatricesĀ i ∈ Z n×m q for i = 0, . . . , d − 1.
• a "short" secret R ∈ Zm ×w chosen at random from an appropriate distribution (typically, a discrete Gaussian) to serve as a trapdoor.
As output it produces a matrix A ∈ Z (nd)×(m+w) q (which is statistically close to uniform, when the parameters and inputĀ are appropriately chosen). In addition, for each tag u ∈ U there is an efficiently computable (from A) matrix A u ∈ Z n×(m+w) q for which R may be a trapdoor, depending on the value of f (u) ∈ R. We write the coefficients of f (z) as a column vector c = (c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c d−1 ) t ∈ R d , and define
To hide the polynomial f , we output the public key
Note that as long as the distribution of [Ā | −ĀR] is statistically close to uniform, then so is A for any f . The tag space for the trapdoor function is the set U ⊂ R. For any tag u ∈ U , define the row vector u t := (u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u d−1 ) ∈ R d (where 0 0 = 1) and the derived matrix for tag u to be
By the condition in Lemma 2.3, R is a (strong) trapdoor for A u exactly when f (u) ∈ R is a unit, because A u · R I = f (u) · G and f (u) represents an invertible linear transformation when it is a unit.
Puncturing
In our cryptosystems and security proofs we will need to generate (using the above procedure) an all-but-d trapdoor function that is "punctured" at up to d tags. More precisely, we are given as input:
• a set of distinct tags P = {u 1 , . . . , u } ⊆ U for some ≤ d,
• uniformly random matrices A * i ∈ Z n×m q for i ∈ [ ] (which often come from an SIS or LWE challenge),
• a "short" secret R ∈ Zm ×w chosen at random from an appropriate distribution (typically, a discrete Gaussian) to serve as a trapdoor,
• optionally, some uniformly random auxiliary matrices Y * i ∈ Z n×k q for i ∈ [ ] and some k ≥ 0.
As output we produce a public key A ∈ Z (nd)×m q and auxiliary matrix Y ∈ Z (nd)×k q so that:
1. Each A u i matches the challenge matrix A * i , and R is only a "weak" trapdoor for A u i . More precisely,
2. R is a (strong) trapdoor for A u for any nonzero u ∈ U \ P , i.e., f (u) is a unit.
3. The auxiliary matrix Y u i := u i t · Y equals the auxiliary input Y * i for each u i ∈ P .
We satisfy these criteria by invoking the above trapdoor generator with the following inputs f andĀ:
1. We define the monic degree-d polynomial
and expand to compute its coefficients c i ∈ R. Note that f (u i ) = 0 for every u i ∈ P , and f (u) is a unit for any nonzero u ∈ U \ P because 0 ∈ U and u i − u j is a unit for every distinct u i , u j ∈ U .
2. We defineĀ using interpolation: let A * ∈ Z (n )×m q denote the stack of challenge matrices A * i , and let V ∈ R ×d be the Vandermonde matrix whose rows are the vectors u i t defined above. We then let A ∈ Z (nd)×m q be a uniformly random solution to V ·Ā = A * .
Such a solution exists, and is efficiently computable and uniformly random (over the uniformly random choice of A * and the random solution chosen). To see this, extend V to an invertible d×d Vandermonde matrix over R having unit determinant i<j (u j − u i ) ∈ R * , by adding d − additional rows u j t for arbitrary distinct u j ∈ U \ P . Likewise, extend A * to have dimension (nd) ×m by adding uniformly random rows. Then for any fixed choice of the (extended) matrix V , the (extended) matrix A * and solutionĀ are in bijective correspondence, and so the latter is uniformly random because the former is.
3. We also define the auxiliary matrix Y similarly using interpolation, as a uniformly random solution to
6 Circular-Secure IBE Our IBE scheme is a generalization of the efficient IBE scheme of Agrawal et al. [ABB10] . Other than some minor changes in the parameters, the main difference is the use of the all-but-d trapdoor construction, which allows us to "puncture" the master public key at up to d identities in the security proof. The scheme has parameters modulus q, message space Z p for some p < q, dimension m, and Gaussian parameters r and γ. We give example instantiations after describing the scheme.
Construction
The identity space for the scheme is U \ {0} ⊂ R, where U , R are constructed as in Section 5.
• Setup(1 n , d): On input security parameter 1 n and secret key clique size d:
, and for i = 0, . . . , d − 1, choose uniformly random
(Note that this is simply calling the all-but-d trapdoor construction from Section 5 with an empty set of punctured tags.) Let
2. The public key is mpk = (A,Ã, y). The master secret key is msk = (R).
• Ext(mpk, msk, u) On input mpk, msk and u ∈ U \ {0} ⊆ R:
,r using the preimage sampling algorithm (Lemma 2.3), so that y u = z 0 − A u z 1 (as in the public-key cryptosystem from Section 4). Output sk u := z 1 . Note that the above is possible because u d ∈ R is a unit, and by our choice of r below, because
with all but negl(n) probability by Lemma 2.1.
• Enc(mpk, u, µ): On input master public key, identity u ∈ U \ {0}, and message µ ∈ Z p do:
, and y u = u t · y.
Choose
• Dec(mpk, sk u = z 1 , c): output the µ ∈ Z p such that c t [
1 ] is closest to p · µ modulo q.
Parameters and Correctness
We need most of the parameters to match the parameters from the public-key encryption scheme, with the additional constraint that r must be large enough that we can run the preimage sampling algorithm (Lemma 2.3) in Ext. Thus, we choose a sufficiently large m = Θ(n log q), r = O(
slightly superpolynomial in n, p = γ · poly(n) for a sufficiently large poly(n) term to ensure correctness, and q = p 2 . We need m = Θ(n log q) so that the stacked matrix A ∈ Z nd×md q is wide enough so that (A,Ã = AR) is statistically close to uniform (by Lemma 2.1) over our choice of A and R.
We now prove correctness. Let c t ← Enc(mpk, u, µ) be a properly generated encryption of µ under identity u, and let z 1 ← Ext(mpk, msk, u). Then we have
Thus, decryption will be correct whenever | x 0 , z 0 + x 1 , z 1 + x 2 | < p/2. By Cauchy-Schwarz and Lemma 2.1, this bound holds except with probability negligible in n (over the choice of all the random variables), as required.
Proof of Security
Theorem 6.1. For the above parameters, the above IBE scheme is selective identity KDM-CPA secure with respect to the set of affine functions over Z p , under the LWE q,χ assumption for χ = D Z,r , and the KDM-CPA security of the system from Section 4.
Answering KDM queries. After receiving the d challenge identities from the adversary, we begin playing the KDM-CPA security game (for the same values of m and d) against a challenger. The challenger sends us each user's public key as (A * i , (y * i ) (1) = z i,0 − A * i z
(1)
, where the z i,0 and z
(1) i,1 are secret. To construct the full syndrome y * i for each challenge identity u i in the IBE scheme, we sample the "bottom part" z (2) i,1 ← D w Z,r , compute (y * i ) (2) = A * i Rz
(2) i,1 , and then set y * i = (y * i ) (1) + (y * i ) (2) . Note that as in the previous game, the A * i , y * i remain statistically close to uniform by Lemma 2.1. We then sample R ← D md×w Z,ω( √ log n)
as usual, and use (A * i , R, y * i , u i ) as the input to our all-but-d trapdoor construction, receiving back A i ,Ã i = −A i R + c i G, and y i for i = 0, . . . , d − 1, which we make the master public key.
We continue to respond to secret key extraction queries as in Game 1, using our all-but-d trapdoor to extract secret keys for all non-challenge identities.
We now show how to respond to the adversary's key-dependent message queries with encryptions of f V β ,w β , where β parameterizes the KDM-CPA security game that we are playing (and is unknown to us because that scheme is KDM-CPA secure). To do so, we need to modify the functions f V 0 ,w 0 , f V 1 ,w 1 given to us by the adversary before passing them along to the KDM-CPA challenger. For k ∈ {0, 1}, our modifications will add to the constant part of each function (w k ) the sum of the inner products of the "bottom part" of each affine function vector (v (2) j,k ) with the "bottom part" of each secret key (z (2) j,1 ). Thus, instead of only being an encryption of a function of "top part" of the secret key, the ciphertext we receive back from the KDM-CPA challenger will in fact be an encryption of f V k ,w k , which is exactly what we need.
Concretely, to respond to key-dependent message queries (f V 0 ,w 0 , f V 1 ,w 1 , i), we first let v j,k = v To complete the proof, we need to show that these ciphertexts are statistically indistinguishable from the ciphertexts in Game 1. The left-most part (b t 0 ) is generated by the KDM-CPA scheme with exactly the same distribution we used to generate b t 0 = x t 0 A * i + (x
1 ) t in Game 1. In Game 1, the center part of the ciphertexts was generated as −x t 0 A * i R + (x
1 ) t , while in this game, the center part is generated as b t 1 = −b t 0 R + (x 1 ) t R is at most poly(n)/γ = negl(n). Since the rest of the center part is distributed identically in Games 1 and 2, we have that the center part in Game 1 is statistically indistinguishable from the center part in Game 2.
Finally, in Game 1, the right part of the ciphertexts was generated as
v j,β , z j,1 + w β ).
In this game, the right part is generated as
i,1 + (x i,1 | ≤ poly(n) except with negligible probability. Lemma 2.2 then gives that the statistical distance between x 2 and x 2 + (x i,1 is at most poly(n)/γ = negl(n), and since the rest of the right part is distributed identically in Games 1 and 2, we have that the right part in Game 1 is statistically indistinguishable from the right part in Game 2.
Therefore, the ciphertexts in Game 1 are statistically indistinguishable from the ciphertexts in Game 2, and so the two games as a whole are statistically indistinguishable. The theorem follows.
